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Abstract
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the
total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among
the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par-
ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly
positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma-
tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii)
Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex-
penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
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1 Introduction
Procurement through government contracts is an important part of economic
activity. The OECD (2002) estimates that the ratio of government procurement
markets to Gross Domestic Product is 19.96% for OECD countries and 14.48%
for non-OECD countries. Public procurement has three main objectives1:
(a) minimization of public expenditures;
∗This paper supersedes all previous versions; in particular Alcalde and Dahm (2003) and
Alcalde and Dahm (2006). We wish to thank Miguel A´ngel Ballester, Luis Corcho´n, Peter
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1In the private sector the value of procurement transactions is estimated to be even larger
than in the public sector (Dimitri et al., 2006). Private firms find it sometimes desirable to
have more than one provider (multiple sourcing). This introduces a similar trade-off to the
one we explain in what follows for the case of public procurement. We focus, however, for
simplicity of the exposition throughout the paper on public procurement.
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(b) provision of population needs; and
(c) promotion of affirmative action policies.
While objective (a) is uncontroversial, it is worth to discuss briefly the impor-
tance of aims (b) and (c) as well as to point out some of their implications.
Effective provision of the needs of the population might require more than
one provider, when there are advantages from multiple sourcing. A multiple
sourcing strategy avoids that the buyer is “locked in” with one provider and
experiences shortage in the case that this supplier cannot fulfill his obligations.
For example, in the autumn of 2004, the U.S. experienced a severe influenza
vaccine shortage because one of two suppliers (Chiron) failed to produce the ex-
pected half of the necessary vaccines. In order to prevent similar problems in the
future the supply of influenza vaccine is procured through multiple suppliers.2
In the U.S. government contracts have long been an important area of affir-
mative action policies at the local, state, and federal level (see e.g. the Small
Business Act from 1953). Targets of these policies are women-owned busi-
nesses, minority-owned businesses, small businesses, disabled-owned businesses,
veteran-owned businesses and others. There are also policies that favor domes-
tic producers: a legal preference for in-state bidders is provided by twenty-seven
states; twenty-one states have “Buy American” laws that affect public procure-
ment; and at the federal level the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act includes a “Buy American” provision.3 Many affirmative action policies ac-
cept that the targeted group is less efficient and establish certain market shares
for these groups as explicit affirmative action goals.4
This implies that multiple sourcing and affirmative action might require to
forgo economies of scale or to procure from several providers with different
efficiency levels. For this reason conventional wisdom holds that there is a
conflict between objective (a) on one hand, and aims (b) and (c), on the other.
Following the language of the affirmative action literature we will refer to this
in the sequel as the trade-off between expenditure minimization and minority
representation. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a procurement
mechanism that is able to reconcile these objectives.
As we will discuss later, other studies have identified particular situations of
affirmative action policies for which the conventional wisdom is not true either
2For instance, California supplies for this reason influenza vaccine through multiple sup-
pliers, see Department of General Services (2009). For an overview of the 2004 influenza
vaccine shortage, see for example the editorial “An Influenza Vaccine Debacle” in the New
York Times, October 20, 2004.
3The Act is available at http://publicservice.evendon.com/RecoveryBill1M.htm accessed
on 03/03/2010. For an exposition and assessment of different affirmative action policies see
Holzer and Neumark (2000). See also NASPO (2009).
4In public procurement bid preferences (or bid credits) are the most popular policies in
order to favor disadvantaged bidders, besides quotas, set-asides or subsidies. Bid preferences
assume implicitly that the targeted group is less efficient. Although any firm that is awarded
the contract is paid the full amount of its bid, targeted firms are treated special. In order
to calculate the winning bid their bids are lowered by a specified percentage amount. Ex-
plicit market shares are, for example, established in California’s Disabled Veteran Business
Enterprise and Small Business Certification Programs.
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(see e.g. the assessment in Holzer and Neumark, 2000). It is, however, impor-
tant to understand the strategic incentives that can be induced through different
bidding mechanisms in such a context. Moreover, as procurement markets are
divers, it is important to identify a wide range of procurement mechanisms that
can reconcile the objectives and assess their performance in different situations.
Avoiding trade-offs between the objectives is important because it influences
the political support for and the prevalence of affirmative action policies. Ayres
and Cramton (1996), for example, report that various California ballot initia-
tives tried to end state-sponsored affirmative action because of the concern that
eliminating affirmative action could help to solve budge problems.
Many procurement procedures employed by public entities resemble roughly
a first-price reverse auction: the buyer announces what kind of items she wishes
to buy and how much can be spent (the budget constraint or reserve price);
potential providers propose prices at which they are willing to provide the items
(make their bids); and the provider proposing the lowest price is chosen.5 In
this article we modify this procedure in one crucial aspect: potential providers
are assigned shares depending endogenously on the bids submitted.
We consider a simple model of two providers with heterogeneous costs. Hav-
ing in mind affirmative action policies that favor domestic firms, the more effi-
cient firm is called the foreign firm and the less efficient the domestic provider.
This model is introduced in Section 3, where we also introduce a general for-
mulation of procurement share auctions and discuss how different procurement
outcomes are evaluated.
Section 4 considers the simplest possible framework and serves as a bench-
mark: The buyer’s budget constraint is truthfully revealed, each seller is com-
pletely informed about the cost structure of his rival, and a specific procurement
auction, which we call contested procurement auction, is analyzed. Variations
of this benchmark in each of these dimensions are considered successively in
later sections. We show the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium in which the domestic high-cost supplier obtains a positive market share,
providing him a strong incentive to participate in the auction.6 The section
concludes with the important result that when competition between suppliers
is weak because of a large asymmetry in costs, then the contested procurement
auction can increase competition and procure at lower costs than a standard
auction. Competition is enhanced because the share auction introduces a new
trade-off compared to a standard auction: increasing the price increases the
mark-up over costs but it decreases the share.
5Carpineti et al. (2006) report, based on a survey conducted in 2004 among a group of
European and American Public Procurement Entities, that public procurement usually awards
contracts based on a first-price sealed bid auction. Krasnokutskaya (2011) reports that the
Michigan Department of Transportation conducts procurement auctions for construction and
maintenance of most roads within Michigan through a first-price sealed-bid auction with
reserve price for every project.
6Stimulating participation is important because a large number of participants is consid-
ered to result in tough competition and therefore in economically advantageous conditions of
procurement, see Albano et al. (2006).
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In Section 5 we explore the following modification of the benchmark Sec-
tion 4. The buyer might have the possibility of hiring an informed auctioneer
who knows the relevant market well and can determine the budged constraint
strategically. We show that if all agents (the auctioneer, as well as the two
providers) are completely informed about the cost structure of both sellers,
there is a unique equilibrium and, thus, the buyer’s optimal budged constraint
is also unique. Moreover, the result of the benchmark is strengthened: for any
cost structure the buyer can determine the budget constraint in such a way that
the procurement share auction allows to purchase at lower costs than a standard
auction.
Section 6 extends the benchmark Section 4 in a different dimension, return-
ing to the assumption that the buyer’s budget constraint is truthfully revealed.
We generalize the contested procurement auction to a class of mechanisms pa-
rameterized by a single parameter, determining the extent to which affirmative
action objectives are pursued. This parameter can be interpreted as the price
elasticity of a seller’s market share and adjusting it affects the trade-off between
mark-up and share that providers face when they decide on their bids. The
procurement auction generalizes the first-price reverse auction because the ex-
treme values of zero and infinity for the elasticity yield the special cases of equal
shares independently of bids and the first-price auction, respectively; the simple
mechanism of Section 4 corresponds to the case in which the elasticity is one.
Our strategic analysis reveals that for any elasticity there is a unique Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies. Moreover, we show that this equilibrium is robust by
relating the original game to a slightly modified game which can be solved by
an iterative process of sequential elimination of dominated strategies (Moulin,
1979). Lastly, we investigate the optimal choice of the elasticity. We show that
for any combination of supplier costs there exists always a mechanism under
which the domestic firm has a positive market share and total procurement
costs are lower than under a standard auction.
The analysis so far has considered the polar case in which providers are
completely informed about each other’s characteristics. The complete informa-
tion setting is considered appropriate for situations in which sellers know each
other well (Moldovanu and Sela, 2003), like the case of construction contracting
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) or in “environments with stable technology”
(Anton and Yao, 1992, p. 691). Our last extension in Section 7 relaxes this
assumption supposing that at the beginning of the auction each provider has
only information about his own cost structure. We propose a continuous-time
descending price auction in order to assign procurement shares. During the
course of the auction all the relevant information is revealed so that at the
unique equilibrium the providers’ actions coincide with those in the complete
information environment of Section 6.
Finally, Section 8 discusses our main assumptions and outlines future re-
search questions. For convenience of the exposition, all proofs are relegated to
the Appendix. We turn now to placing our paper into the relevant literature.
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2 Literature
The present paper relates and contributes to several different strands of litera-
ture.
2.1 Share auctions, contests and split award auctions
In his seminal paper on auctions for shares, Wilson (1979) studies a different
bidding mechanism and symmetric bidders and finds the opposite result to ours:
a share auction can yield a significantly lower sale price than a standard auction.
Kremer and Nyborg (2004) have shown that this conclusion depends on the
allocation rule (see also Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). Our setting differs
from Wilson’s because we focus on asymmetric bidders.7
In a contest contenders exert effort in order to win an indivisible rent; the
purpose of these models is thus different form ours. From a mathematical point
of view, however, the central element of a contest, the so-called contest success
function, is closely related to the concept of a procurement share auction pro-
posed in the present paper. From this perspective, the present paper makes the
following contribution to contest theory. Contest games are either specified as
all-pay auctions (see Konrad, 2009) or as winner-pay contests (see Yates, 2011).
The latter corresponds to the present paper. Epstein et al. (2011) consider
an all-pay auction setting and a contest organizer whose payoff function is a
weighted sum of contestants welfare and total effort. They establish that the
organizer chooses the most deterministic contest success function which yields
important support for the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Our results, however,
indicate that in a winner-pay contest this result might be reversed (at least when
the weight associated to total effort is high enough).8
A split-award auction divides procurement between two suppliers. In a sem-
inal paper Anton and Yao (1989) have shown that sole-source procurement (or
single sourcing) is more advantageous than a split-award (or multiple sourcing).
Much of the subsequent literature has focused on conditions under which this
conclusion is true (Anton and Yao, 1992; Perry and Sa´kovics, 2003; Inderst,
2008; Anton et al., 2010; Gong et al., 2011). Given that in a split-award auction
the split is exogenous, while in our proposal the shares depend endogenously on
bids, our results suggests that Anton and Yao’s conclusion might be sensitive
to the assumption of an exogenous split.
7Our model can easily be reformulated as a standard auction in which the organizer is a
seller and participants are buyers. This would not affect most of our results.
8We are investigating this issue in ongoing work. The generalized contested procurement
auction proposed in the present paper is very closely related to the serial contest success
function in Alcalde and Dahm (2007). The latter paper, however, analyzes an all-pay auction.
Yates (2011) is closely related to our paper because he applies the serial contest success
function in a winner-pay contest. He establishes an equilibrium in a setting that corresponds
to our Theorem 1.
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2.2 Affirmative action in procurement
An important implication of our paper is that pursuing affirmative action and
minimizing purchasing costs are not necessarily in conflict. This is an important
finding because it implies that affirmative action policies are not necessarily
costly and thus do not need to be justified (solely) on fairness grounds. Other
affirmative action policies also have the potential to reconcile both objectives
(see also the assessment in Holzer and Neumark, 2000).
Rothkopf et al. (2003) offer a model of asymmetric providers in a common
value environment in order to analyze the effect of subsidies to a high-cost sup-
plier. They show that subsidies can reduce procurement costs because they
induce low-cost suppliers to bid more aggressively. While it is difficult to com-
pare the performance of our mechanism to subsidies, the former seems to be
more tractable. Rothkopf et al. (2003) restrict each bidder to bid a multiple
of his cost estimate because the analysis of this asymmetric auction setting is
challenging. In contrast, under complete information our mechanism is domi-
nance solvable, while with private information the equilibrium is in dominant
strategies.
Bid preferences also have the potential to foster competition between sup-
pliers and reconcile both objectives. This has been shown in theoretical models
of bid preferences for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctions
(Ayres and Cramton, 1996), government procurement from domestic and for-
eign firms (McAfee and McMillan, 1989), and entry in procurement auctions
(Hubbard and Paarsch, 2009).9 The share auction of the present paper offers
some advantages over bid preferences because the success of affirmative action
does not depend on whether the cost difference between providers exceeds a
threshold or not. To see this, suppose a bid preference of five percent and a
large cost difference between two suppliers such that the equilibrium bid dif-
ference is six percent. Here the market share of the “weak” bidder is zero. In
contrast, our mechanism always assigns a positive share to the “weak” bidder.
2.3 Optimal auctions with asymmetric bidders
The bidding mechanism of the present paper assigns a positive share to the
“weak” bidder. As a result competition increases and revenue is raised compared
to a second price auction. This parallels findings in the literature on auctions for
an indivisible object with asymmetric bidders, where competition and revenue
can also be increased when the item is not always awarded to a bidder with the
highest valuation.10 In Myerson (1981) the optimal auction may require to give
9The empirical literature on bid preferences, however, yields mixed results. Support comes
from experimental evidence (Corns and Schotter, 1999) and snow removal contracts in Mon-
treal (Flambard and Perrigne, 2006), while studies of road construction contracts (Marion,
2007; Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011) do not find such an effect.
10Notice that the auction theoretical literature usually considers models of incomplete in-
formation. We extend our findings to such a setting in Section 7. In addition, the comparison
of our model to this literature is meaningful when the shares assigned by the bidding mech-
anism are interpreted as win probabilities of an indivisible object. This requires to assume
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the object to a bidder whose valuation is not the highest. Maskin and Riley
(2000) compare the sealed high-bid and “English” auctions and show that, even
when the asymmetry between bidders is not so large that the “strong” bidder
always preempts the “weak” bidder and the latter sometimes wins, expected
revenue in the former may be higher than in the latter. In that literature,
however, the auction choice depends on the asymmetry. In contrast, we show
that for any degree of asymmetry the auction proposed can be modified such
that it performs better than a standard auction.
2.4 Allocation of a divisible commodity
Bidding mechanisms have been proposed for the allocation of a variety of di-
visible goods for which our mechanism might be interesting because revenue
and non-revenue objectives might be in conflict. For instance, Morgan (1995)
analyzes the management of fisheries and proposes to allocate fishing quotas
through an auction in order to obtain revenues and to take into account other
objectives, like protecting traditional, native users of the resource or meeting
conservation goals. In the assignment of takeoff and landing rights at airports
non-revenue considerations might include favoring domestic or small airlines and
Grether et al. (1981) propose to auction off these rights.
Back and Zender (1993) and Swierzbinski and Bo¨rgers (2004) analyze Trea-
sury bond auctions in which there is a concern that the bond market can be
manipulated. This leads in some markets (including the U.S.) to the establish-
ment of a limit on the amount a single buyer can purchase. Cramton (2002)
discusses the virtues of spectrum auctions and reports a trade-off between gen-
erating revenue for the Treasury and avoiding a collusive industry structure,
which explains why regulators usually limit the amount of spectrum that a firm
can hold in a geographic area.
Boycko et al. (1993) provide an account of the Russian privatization program
which used voucher auctions for shares of firms. They report that political sup-
port for privatization required that “weak” bidders (like workers in enterprises
being privatized) obtained an important share of the firm. Dana and Spier
(1994) characterize the optimal auction for production rights and stress that
the choice between monopoly, duopoly or government production should be
endogenous as a function of bids. They also discuss the trade-off between rev-
enue of privatization and assigning several firms a positive market share which
induces competition between firms.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Agents
A buyer, which we denote with subindex 0, wishes to buy a certain quantity of
a good. This good is perfectly divisible and the total amount to be procured is
that bidders are risk neutral.
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normalized to 1. The buyer faces a budged constraint B0, which is considered
fixed throughout the paper.
There are two sellers (or providers) who are able to provide the buyer’s needs
entirely or in part. Let I = {d, f} denote the set of potential providers, where
d refers to the domestic provider and f to the foreign one. When providing the
whole amount seller i ∈ I incurs (total) cost ci. We assume throughout the
paper that
0 ≤ cf < cd < B0. (1)
Both firms are able to provide the whole amount at constant marginal costs
without exceeding the buyer’s budget; and–given that we are interested in af-
firmative action–the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign provider.
3.2 Procurement Share Auctions
We start by proposing a general notion of procurement share auctions, that
assigns procurement shares endogenously depending on a vector of bids P =
(pd, pf ). We interpret pi as the price of providing the procurer’s demand com-
pletely. Notice that the following definition a priori does not require positive
minority representation.
Definition 1 A procurement share auction is a function
Ψ : R3+ → R2+
such that for each budged constraint11 B ≥ 0, and any P ∈ R2+,
Ψd (B,P ) + Ψf (B,P ) ∈ {0, 1} .
We consider procurement auctions satisfying two requirements. On one
hand, a feasibility condition: any provider proposing a price higher than the
buyer’s budget constraint will not be a supplier. On the other hand, a mono-
tonicity condition: the sellers’ shares are responsive to the prices announced.
Formally,
(i) for each i ∈ I, if B < pi then Ψi (B,P ) = 0; and
(ii) for each P ∈ R2+, any i ∈ I, and j 6= i, if pi ≤ pj then Ψi (B,P ) ≥
Ψj (B,P ).
When seller i provides a procurement share Ψi of the total quantity, his
profits are
Ui (B,P ) = Ψi (B,P ) [pi − ci] . (2)
Given a procurement auction Ψ, and the budged constraint B0, we can
describe the normal form game Γ = {I, S, U , Ψ} in which the set of agents
is I, each agent’s strategy space is the interval [0, B0] and provider i’s utility
follows expression (2) with B = B0.
11In most of our analysis the budged constraint B will be assumed to coincide with the real
constraint B0.
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3.3 Procurement Objectives
As explained in the Introduction, conventional wisdom holds that there exists
a trade-off between expenditure minimization, on one hand, and minority rep-
resentation, on the other. A main result of this paper is to show that such a
trade-off does not need to exist. We derive this result under the assumption
that the buyer only values expenditure minimization and show that this can
justify assigning the domestic firm a positive share. Minority representation is
realized as a byproduct. This assumption makes it more difficult to reconcile the
objectives, and so makes our results more striking. We discuss different ways to
model the benefits from minority representation in the concluding section.
In order to measure expenditure minimization consider a procurement share
vector ψ = (ψd, ψf ) ≥ 0, with ψd + ψf = 1; and a price vector P = (pf , pd).
The savings function associates to each pair (ψ, P ) and budged constraint B,
the value12
S0 (B, ψ, P ) = B − ψ · P = ψd (B − pd) + ψf (B − pf ) . (3)
As already mentioned, procurement auctions are usually organized as first-
price auctions. Therefore, we will compare the procurement costs of our mech-
anism to the cost of the domestic firm, which is also the cost of a Vickrey
auction.13 Throughout the paper we measure minority representation by the
share of the domestic provider.
4 Contested Procurement Auction
In this section we propose a procurement auction inspired in a classical proposal
for bankruptcy situations: the Contested Garment Principle. (See Dagan, 1996
for an analysis of this bankruptcy solution).14 From a normative point of view,
this auction fulfills not only the monotonicity condition proposed in the previous
section, but is also continuous.15 From a positive point of view, we will see, that
it admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
12To be fully precise, as equation (3) is maximized when there is no procurement, that is
ψd + ψf = 0, we postulate in this case S0 (B, ψ, P ) = 0.
13Given that we start by considering a complete information environment, there is the
technical issue that the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information
does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The focus on the cost of the domestic
firm, however, can be justified as the limiting equilibrium of a modified game with smallest
monetary unit when the grid size goes to zero and ties are randomly broken, see Alcalde and
Dahm (2011a).
14Following the contested garment principle a creditor (provider) receives half the estate E
plus half of the difference between his claim ci and the opponent’s claim cj : (E/2 + (c1 −
c2)/2, E/2 + (c2 − c1)/2). To see the relationship to our procurement auction set the estate
equal to one and define a claim as the savings that each provider offers ci = B0−pi. Supposing
c1 > c2, procurement shares are (1/2+(c1−c2)/(2c1), 1/2+(c2−c1)/(2c1)). So the difference
is that our procurement auction depends on the percentage mark-up (c1 − c2)/c1 rather than
the absolute mark-up c1 − c2. This implies homogeneity of degree zero in claims which seems
to be a desirable property in the context of procurement auctions.
15The auction is continuous everywhere except when pf = pd = B0.
9
Definition 2 Given B0 and P = (pd, pf ), the contested procurement auction
Ψcp associates to provider i the share
Ψcpi (B0, P ) =
B0 − 2pi + max {pd, pf}
2 [B0 −min {pd, pf}] .
To be fully precise, when pd = pf = B0 the auction assigns equal shares,
as required by the monotonicity condition. Remember also that the feasibility
condition restricts providers to propose prices that do not exceed the budget
B0.
We refer to the game associated to Ψcp, namely Γcp = {I, S, U , Ψcp}, as
contested procurement. Our first result determines the unique Nash equilibrium
of this game. Since this result is a corollary of Theorem 3, its proof is omitted.
Theorem 1 Game Γcp has a unique Nash equilibrium, P ∗, described by
p∗d =
B0 + cd
2
, and
p∗f = B0 −
(B0 − cf )
1
2 (B0 − cd)
1
2
2
.
Let us observe that, at equilibrium, the domestic provider obtains a positive
profit. Moreover, the buyer’s expected savings are16
S0 (B0, P
∗) =
B0 − cd
4
[
2
(
B0 − cf
B0 − cd
) 1
2
+
(
B0 − cd
B0 − cf
) 1
2
− 1
]
.
Note that, in particular, if
B0 − cf
B0 − cd >
(
21
8
+
5
8
√
17
)
≈ 5.2019 (4)
it holds that S0 (B0, P
∗) > B0 − cd. This implies the following result.
Corollary 1 When the cost difference between providers is large enough, the
buyer prefers contested procurement to a second-price reverse auction.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The domestic provider has a strong
incentive to participate and propose a price pd below the budget B0, since
this guarantees strictly positive profits. As a result competition is enhanced
because the foreign supplier faces a new trade-off compared to a standard auc-
tion: increasing the price increases the mark-up over costs but it decreases the
share. When competition is weak because the cost difference of providers is
large, increasing the share is an important consideration for the foreign sup-
plier. Consequently contested procurement performs better than a second-price
reverse auction.
16For simplicity, given a procurement auction Ψ, we denote throughout the paper the savings
by S0 (B0, P ) instead of S0 (B0,Ψ (B0, P ) , P ).
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Figure 1: Cost savings relative to standard auction.
5 Contested Procurement with an Informed Auc-
tioneer
As we have seen in the previous section contested procurement has the potential
to reconcile the aims of expenditures minimization and minority representation.
This result hinges, however, on the cost difference between providers being large
enough. In this section we investigate how the buyer can take advantage of an
informed auctioneer who knows the relevant market well. Such an auctioneer has
more information about the cost structure of the providers and can determine
the budged constraint strategically.
We will assume the extreme case in which the auctioneer is completely in-
formed about the providers’ cost. Notice, however, that even under the assump-
tion that the auctioneer does not know the costs of suppliers, a reserve price can
be determined. For instance, Krasnokutskaya (2011) reports that the Michigan
Department of Transportation conducts procurement auctions for construction
and maintenance of most roads within Michigan through a first-price sealed-bid
auction. It also derives a reserve price for every project which is based on an
engineer’s assessment of the work required to perform each task, prices derived
from the winning bids for similar projects, adjustment through a price deflator
and the requirement that the winning bid should be lower than 110% of the
engineer’s estimate.
Before formalizing the strategic analysis of the auctioneer’s choice of the
budged constraint, it is useful to describe the trade-off between expenditures
minimization and minority representation further. Notice that when the de-
clared budged constraint does not coincide with B0, expression (3) does not
measure the savings correctly. For this reason we measure expenditures mini-
mization by total procurement cost of the contested auction.
Figure 1 represents the trade-off between expenditures minimization and
11
minority representation. The latter is measured on the abscissa, while the ordi-
nate indicates the cost difference between a standard auction and the contested
procurement auction as a proportion of the cost difference of the providers.
The figure shows that the contested procurement mechanism does not perform
worse than a standard auction until a minority representation of roughly 22%
is reached. Given that we assume that the buyer wishes to minimize procure-
ment costs, she should choose the reserve price B in such a way that minority
representation is roughly 11% and procurement cost savings with respect to the
sealed-bid first-price auction is roughly 5,5%.
It is, however, worth pointing out that in reality buyers with affirmative
action goals accept to trade-off some procurement costs for minority represen-
tation. The figure shows that higher minority representations, exceeding 11%,
can only be reached when cost savings are lower (and eventually negative). How
this trade-off is resolved depends on the preferences of the buyer and will vary
with the context. For example, California’s Disabled Veteran Business Enter-
prise and Small Business Certification Programs have with three percent and
twenty-five percent, respectively, different aims for minority representation. No-
tice that these values are close to those for which the contested procurement
auction performs better than a standard auction.
We formalize now the auctioneer’s choice of the budged constraint. Consider
the following sequential game:
(1) Budged Stage: The auctioneer selectsB ∈ [0, B0],17 which becomes known
to the suppliers.
(2) Contest Stage: Providers choose simultaneously prices pi ∈ [0, B) ∪ {∅},
i ∈ I. Choosing pi = ∅ allows providers to reject supplying the buyer
when the budged is very low.18
Given the actions selected by all the players (B; pd, pf ), the mechanism pro-
ceeds as follows:
(A) If there is a provider i ∈ I such that pi = ∅, then there is no procurement
and providers and auctioneer obtain zero payoffs.19
(B) Otherwise, i.e. if both providers propose a price not exceeding B, then the
payoffs are:
17We suppose for simplicity that B ≤ B0. This makes sense when the auctioneer is required
to document that the buyer is able to procure at this price. When B0 is very low, there could
be an incentive to choose B > B0 but it is straightforward to take that into account in the
proof of Theorem 2.
18We exclude for simplicity that pi = B. This assures that the domestic firm has a unique
best reply when B = cd and does not reduce the set of equilibria.
19This assumption is a simple way of focusing on the range for B that allows minority
representation. By assuming that the buyer is only interested in cost minimization we have
made our results very strong. Assuming that when pi = ∅ the other firm is the sole provider
opens the door for the uninteresting choice B = cf .
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Figure 2: Optimal B when cf = 0 and cd = 1.
(a) For the auctioneer
S0 (B0; Ψ
cp (B;P ) ;P ) = B0 − pdΨcpd (B; pd, pf )− pfΨcpf (B; pd, pf ) .
(b) For each provider i ∈ I
Πi (B0; Ψ
cp (B;P ) ;P ) = Ψcpi (B; pd, pf ) [pi − ci] .
Let us denote by Γ2Scp the game previously described. Our solution concept
is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, SPNE henceforth. We also focus on
undominated prices (in pure strategies) at the Contest Stage.
Theorem 2 Game Γ2Scp has a unique20 SPNE.
The proof of Theorem 2 is relegated to Appendix A but an intuition for
this result can be gained with the help of Figure 2, which indicates procurement
costs as a function of different budged choices, assuming that cd = 1 and cf = 0.
Notice first that in order to obtain positive profits the auctioneer must propose a
budged that is so high that both providers can submit a profitable bid. That is,
the budged constraint must exceed cd. This implies by Theorem 1 that for each
budged the second stage has a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, procurement
costs are a strictly convex function of the budged, and approach cd (from below)
as B tends to cd, see Figure 2. Therefore, at the first stage there is an optimal
value Bˆ different from cd.
This has two implications. On the one hand, whenever B0 > Bˆ, the cost
of employing the contested procurement auction and revealing the budged con-
strained truthfully exceeds the cost of the same auction when the budged is
strategically chosen.
20To be fully precise, there are several payoff-equivalent SPNE. The multiplicity arises
because the foreign firm might choose any undominated bid when the auctioneer chooses a
budged that lies between the costs of providers. On the equilibrium path such a budged is
not chosen. Thus, there is a unique
(
B∗; p∗d,p
∗
f
)
selected at equilibrium.
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Corollary 2 Let
(
p∗d, p
∗
f
)
be the unique Nash equilibrium for Γcp. Similarly,
let
(
Bˆ; pˆd, pˆf
)
be selected at a SPNE for Γ2Scp. Then
pˆdΨ
cp
d
(
Bˆ; pˆd, pˆf
)
+ pˆfΨ
cp
f
(
Bˆ; pˆd, pˆf
)
≤ p∗dΨcpd
(
B0; p
∗
d, p
∗
f
)
+ p∗fΨ
cp
f
(
B0; p
∗
d, p
∗
f
)
.
On the other hand, the cost of a standard auction exceeds the cost of the
contested procurement auction when the budged is strategically chosen. In the
example of Figure 2 a standard auction implies procurement costs of 1. The
contested procurement auction with a strategically chosen budged has costs of
0.945; the cost reduction is 5.5%, as mentioned before.
Corollary 3 The buyer prefers to employ Ψ2Scp and choose the budged strate-
gically, rather than to have a second-price reverse auction.
6 Generalized Contested Procurement
For the remainder of the paper we return to the assumption that the buyer’s
budget constraint is truthfully revealed. In this section we introduce a gener-
alized version of contested procurement. This defines a family of procurement
auctions characterized by a single parameter. We offer a strategic analysis of
this family and investigate the buyer’s optimal choice of a member of this family.
6.1 Definition and Properties
Consider the following generalization of Definition 2.21
Definition 3 Let α be a positive real number. Given B0 and P = (pd, pf ), the
generalized contested procurement auction Ψcpα is defined as
Ψcpα (B0, P ) =

(
2(B0−pd)α−(B0−pf )α
2(B0−pd)α ,
(B0−pf )α
2(B0−pd)α
)
if pd ≤ pf < B0(
(B0−pd)α
2(B0−pf )α ,
2(B0−pf )α−(B0−pd)α
2(B0−pf )α
)
if pf ≤ pd < B0
where the first component refers to the domestic and the second to the foreign
provider.
Following Subsection 3.2, generalized contested procurement is defined as
the game associated to Ψcpα , namely Γcpα = {I, S, U , Ψcpα}. Notice that this
generalized mechanism fulfills several interesting properties.
On one hand, it defines a family of auctions characterized by a single param-
eter. It is straightforward to verify that this parameter measures the elasticity of
a supplier’s procurement share with regard to his price. Generalized contested
21As before, when pd = pf = B0, the auction assigns equal shares. Remember also that the
feasibility condition restricts providers to propose prices that do not exceed the budget B0.
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procurement generalizes the first-price reverse auction, because it encompasses
it as a polar case (for α → ∞; the other polar case is egalitarian assignment
irrespective of bids for α → 0). Contested procurement investigated in Section
4 is obtained for α = 1.
On the other hand, it can easily be verified that the auction fulfills the follow-
ing desirable properties. First, it is anonymous so that shares are independent of
providers’ labels and depend only on prices. Second, it is continuous.22 Third,
the shares are monotonic in bids. Fourth, the assignment is homogeneous, that
is, it is independent of the nume´raire employed.
6.2 Strategic Analysis
We establish now that the game Γcpα = {I, S, U , Ψcpα} has a unique Nash
equilibrium. A proof of this result is relegated to Appendix B but it is instruc-
tive to notice that the equilibrium prices of providers can be computed in a
simple sequential way. First, the domestic provider computes his optimal price
conditional on not being lower than the price of the foreign supplier
p′d = arg max Ud (B0; pd, pf )
s.t. pf ≤ pd.
}
(5)
It is important that it turns out that p′d is independent of pf , except for the
fact that the latter must not be higher than p′d. Once the optimal price of the
domestic firm is anticipated, the foreign provider computes his optimal price,
under the assumption not to exceed p′d
p′f = arg max Uf (B0; p
′
d, pf )
s.t. pf ≤ p′d.
}
(6)
We have the following result.
Theorem 3 For each α > 0, game Γcpα = {I, S, U , Ψcpα} has a unique Nash
equilibrium.
6.3 Robustness
We next offer a robustness analysis of the equilibrium. We show that an itera-
tive procedure of deleting dominated strategies converges to a unique strategy
for each player. This strategy is the one employed at the unique equilibrium
in Theorem 3. Therefore, in the terminology of Moulin (1979) the game is
dominance solvable.
This result requires an additional assumption. The reason for this assump-
tion is technical; to avoid an open set problem at the starting point of the
iterative procedure. This assumption is a mild strengthening of the feasibility
condition in Subsection 3.2 and can be motivated as follows. Suppose there is a
22To be fully precise, it is continuous everywhere except when pf = pd = B0.
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smallest monetary unit and the convention that providers have to bid strictly be-
low the budged constrained B0. To fix ideas, imagine that B0 = $1, 000, 000.01,
and that no agent will ask for more than $1 million.
Formally, any price above some threshold B′, close to B0 implies that the
provider’s share is zero.23 Strengthening the feasibility condition in Subsection
3.2 in this way implies the following slight change to the generalized contested
procurement auction Ψcpα from Definition 3. Let ΨcpαB
′
be the function that
to each B0, P = (pd, pf ) and B
′ < B0 associates the vector
ΨcpαB
′
(B0; pd, pf ) =

(
1− (B0−pf )α2(B0−pd)α ,
(B0−pf )α
2(B0−pd)α
)
if pd ≤ pf ≤ B′(
(B0−pd)α
2(B0−pf )α , 1−
(B0−pd)α
2(B0−pf )α
)
if pf ≤ pd ≤ B′
(1, 0) if pd ≤ B′ < pf
(0, 1) if pf ≤ B′ < pd
(0, 0) if B′ < min {pd, pf} .
As a consequence, the induced game ΓcpαB
′
=
{
I, S, U , ΨcpαB′
}
is a slight
modification of the original game Γcpα . Although the games Γcpα and ΓcpαB
′
are not the same, provided that B′ is arbitrarily close to B0, the equilibrium
predictions for ΓcpαB
′
should also be reasonable for the game Γcpα . With this in
mind the implication of the next result, whose proof can be found in Appendix
B, is that Theorem 3 is robust.
Theorem 4 For any α > 0 and each B′ < B0, the game ΓcpαB
′
is dominance
solvable.
6.4 Optimal Choice of the Elasticity
In this subsection we investigate the buyer’s optimal choice of the elasticity of
the procurement auction. To do so we relate the buyer’s savings to α.
To gain an intuition notice that the solution of problem (5) is24
p′d =
B0 + αcd
α+ 1
(7)
and that the solution of problem (6) must satisfy
(
B0 − p′f
)
=
1
2
(
B0 − p′d
B0 − p′f
)α [
B0 + (α− 1) p′f − αcf
]
. (8)
Analyzing the polar cases yields the following intuitive facts:
23Even though Theorem 4 is true for any B′ < B0, for interpretative purposes we will
consider that B′ is very close to B0.
24Equations (7) and (8) are obtained from the standard first order conditions relative to
programs (5) and (6) respectively.
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(i) When α→ 0 the allocation procedure is perfectly inelastic and assigns half
of the demand to each supplier independent of prices. The equilibrium
converges to the one in a fair lottery with an indivisible prize and each
procurer asks for the whole budged, i.e.
lim
α→0
p′f (α) = lim
α→0
p′d (α) = B0.
(ii) When α→∞ the allocation procedure is perfectly elastic and converges to
a first-price reverse auction, i.e.25
limα→∞ p′f (α) = limα→∞ p
′
d (α) = cd; and
limα→∞Ψ
cpα
f (B0;P
′) = 1, limα→∞Ψ
cpα
d (B0;P
′) = 0.
These two facts seem to indicate that any generalized contested procurement
induces an average price higher than the second lowest cost. This intuition is
reinforced by inspection of equation (7), because–although p′d is a strictly de-
creasing function of α–the domestic provider’s price is always higher than his
costs. The foreign supplier could, thus, choose a price between the domestic
provider’s price and costs. Nevertheless, as the next theorem shows, this intu-
ition is not true. The reason is that for high α equation (8) introduces a concave
relationship between p′f and α. Taking into account the extreme values of p
′
f –
i.e. B0 for α→ 0, and cd for α→∞ – this concavity implies the existence of a
value αˆ whose associated p′f is a minimum, and thus is lower than cd. It turns
out that the foreign supplier might be induced to make a very competitive bid.
As a result, the following statement is true.
Theorem 5 There is α > 0 such that, at equilibrium, S0 (B0, P
′) > B0 − c2.
A formal proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix B. The theorem
indicates a trade-off in the selection of the elasticity. Given a pair of bids,
lowering the elasticity raises the market share of the domestic supplier. This
implies, on one hand, to pay for the total share of the domestic firm a relatively
high price. But on the other hand, it forces the foreign supplier to bid lower
than he otherwise would, driving down the payment for this market share. For
moderate choices of the elasticity, the overall effect is to induce very competitive
procurement. But for extreme values this is not true. With very egalitarian
policies the share of the domestic firm is large and procurement becomes costly.
When the elasticity is high, the foreign supplier wins a large share and does not
need to bid very competitive, as in a standard auction.
25First-price auctions have no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies under complete infor-
mation. Nevertheless, the following strategies can be considered the “intuitive solution” and
motivated by imposing the existence of a smallest monetary unit; see Alcalde and Dahm
(2011a) for more details. Given that our assignment process admits a probabilistic interpre-
tation (assuming that bidders are risk neutral), a by-product of our model is to provide a
different way to restore the equilibrium in the first-price auction under complete information:
As the noise in the assignment process goes to zero, the intuitive solution is obtained.
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7 Generalized Contested Procurement with Pri-
vate Information
The analysis so far has considered the polar case in which providers are com-
pletely informed about each other’s characteristics. We relax this assumption
now and focus on the other polar case in which each supplier only has (pri-
vate) information about his own costs, but does not know the costs of his rival.
We propose to implement generalized contested procurement by means of a
(continuous-time) sequential mechanism. During the course of the auction in-
formation about rivals is not needed because all the relevant information is
revealed. As a result at the unique equilibrium the providers’ actions coincide
with those in the complete information environment of Section 6.
For α given, the mechanism proceeds as follows. At any t ∈ [0, 1) each
provider i knows his own costs ci and the messages selected by both sellers at
any t′ < t. This information structure is common knowledge. Both providers
simultaneously select their messages mi (t) ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 is interpreted as
‘continuing’ and 1 as ‘stopping’. At t = 1 the auction is over and we interpret
this as both sellers choosing message mi (1) = 1. Given the providers’ message
functions mi : [0, 1]→ {0, 1}, let t˜i be the first time in which i’s message is 1.26
With this the price paid for seller i’s share is
p˜i =
(
1− t˜i
)
B0.
Given the sellers’ prices P˜ = (p˜d, p˜f ), procurement shares are assigned according
to Ψcpα , and thus provider i’s utility is
Πi = (p˜i − ci) Ψcpαi
(
B0; P˜
)
.
Let Γctcpα denote the continuous time generalized contested procurement
game above described. Let us observe that a strategy for provider i, say si,
must prescribe, for each t ∈ [0, 1) a message mi that should depend not only
on t, but also on the messages set by both providers at any t′ < t.
We explore now the behavior of suppliers in this bidding game for a given
α. Consider seller i and suppose that his opponent’s message is 0 for any t
lower than some t¯. This implies that seller i also selects, at time t¯ a message
mi (t¯) = 0, except if
(1− t¯)B0 = B0 + αci
α+ 1
. (9)
The reason is that, given that his opponent has not yet fixed a price, by setting
a message equal to 1, supplier i becomes the seller asking for the highest price.
As we have seen in Section 6, when provider i asks for the highest price he
selects pi as established in equation (9).
26I.e. t˜i is such that m
(
t˜i
)
= 1, and m (t) = 0 for all t < t˜i.
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For tˆ given, let us assume that both agents have chosen message md (t) =
mf (t) = 0 for each t < tˆ, and that provider j selects mj
(
tˆ
)
= 1. In such a case,
any optimal decision for provider i 6= j involves that mi (t) = 0, for any t < t˘i
and mi
(
t˘i
)
= 1, where27
t˘i = arg max [(1− t)B0 − ci] Ψcpαf
(
B0;
(
1− tˆ)B0, (1− t)B0)
s.t. tˆ ≤ t ≤ 1
}
(10)
Note that these arguments allow us to say that the strategies used by
providers to select their messages are dominant strategies. The next theo-
rem, whose proof is omitted,28 establishes the equivalence of the equilibrium
procurement shares under Γcpα and Γctcpα .
Theorem 6 Given a profile of strategies
(
s′d, s
′
f
)
for Γctcpα , let m′i denote the
seller i’s message function induced by
(
s′d, s
′
f
)
. Then,
(
s′d, s
′
f
)
is an equilibrium
for Γctcpα , in dominant strategies, if, and only if,
(a) m′d (t) = 0 for each t < td, and m
′
d (td) = 1; and
(b) m′f (t) = 0 for each t < tf , and m
′
f (tf ) = 1, where
td =
α
α+1
B0−cd
B0
, and
tf maximizes [(1− t)B0 − cf ] Ψcpαf (B0; (1− td)B0, (1− t)B0) .
}
(11)
Note that, as a consequence of Theorem 6, we have the following.
Corollary 4 Let
(
p′d, p
′
f
)
be the equilibrium prices when agents play the game
Γcpα , and (pˆd, pˆf ) those established when playing Γ
ctcpα . Then,
(
p′d, p
′
f
)
=
(pˆd, pˆf ).
8 Conclusion
This paper is a step toward understanding under what conditions procurement
can reconcile the conflicting aims of expenditures minimization and minority
representation. Rather than reviewing our results, in this concluding section
we discuss some of our assumptions most of which indicate questions for future
research.
27Note that, since Ψcpα is symmetric, i.e Ψcpαd
(
B0, pd, pf
)
= Ψcpαf
(
B0, pf , pd
)
, there is
no loss of generality in considering that the supplier described in Expression (10) below is the
foreign seller.
28A proof which is not intended for publication can be found in Appendix C.
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Practicability of an improvement over a standard auction
We have seen that the conflicting procurement objectives can be reconciled when
the buyer or her auctioneer chooses either the budged constraint strategically
(Section 5) or the elasticity of the procurement auction (Subsection 6). In both
cases the optimal choice requires information on providers’ costs.
It is not unreasonable that some information can be obtained. We have
already discussed that the Michigan Department of Transportation derives cost
estimates for construction and maintenance of most roads within Michigan (see
Krasnokutskaya, 2011 and Section 5). Also when procurement auctions take
place repeatedly the buyer might have experience with the suppliers and choose
a mechanism that performs well. In other instances, however, the buyer might
have less reliable estimates of the bidders’ costs. But our findings are robust.
In the context of Section 5, imprecise estimates of providers’ costs combined
with the desire “to be on the safe side” could lead to a budged choice that is
higher than the optimal budged. It turns out, however, that procurement costs
are lower than under a second price auction provided (3.2725cd − cf )/2.2725 ≥
B0 holds. This threshold is increasing in the cost difference that justifies af-
firmative action. In the extreme when cf = 0, the mechanism outperforms a
second-price reverse auction until the budget is 44% higher than the domestic
firm’s cost.
In Subsection 6 when the elasticity is selected,—rather than searching for
the optimal value of the elasticity—the buyer might choose among a small set
of elasticities and still improve upon a standard auction. Consider the following
example in which again cf = 0 and the budged is normalized to 1. To make
affirmative action meaningful suppose that cd is larger than 0.25. It can be
shown that it is enough to choose among a low, intermediate and high elasticity.
More precisely, it is enough to choose (roughly) for values between 0.25 and 0.65
an elasticity of 15, for values between 0.65 and 0.9 an elasticity of 5, and for
values between 0.9 and 1 an elasticity of 1. Figure 3 shows on the abscissa the
costs of the domestic provider. The ordinate displays the savings associated
to a standard auction (dotted line) and to the contested procurement auction
depending on the choice among these elasticities.
The multi-provider case
Our analysis restricts to two providers and a natural extension is to consider
the multi-provider case. Alcalde and Dahm (2011b) explore such a setting and
propose an extension of the procurement share auction which maintains the
philosophy underlying the contested procurement auction. Alcalde and Dahm
(2011b) show that when the sellers’ provision costs are relatively homogeneous
but different the equilibrium might not be unique. As a consequence equilibrium
prices might not be not accurately correlated with the cost of providers; i.e. it
might be the case that c1 < c2 < c3 and, at some equilibrium, pˆ3 < pˆ1 < pˆ2. For
these reasons Alcalde and Dahm (2011b) pursue a different route and propose to
reduce the original multi-provider problem to the two-provider case. Roughly
20
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
savings
standard auction
α = 15
α = 5
α = 1
cd
Figure 3: Example of savings for cf = 0 and B0 = 1.
speaking the procedure is as follows. The potential providers fix prices and
the two lowest bidders compete in a contested procurement auction in which
the relevant budged constraint is endogenously determined through the prices
of the remaining high bidders. From the perspective of the present paper the
extension to multiple providers does not seem to yield new insights into the
trade-off between expenditure minimization and minority representation.
More general cost structures
An interesting question for future research considers a setting in which the tech-
nologies of providers are not (necessarily) linear. On one hand, the introduction
of economies of scale should make it more difficult to reconcile expenditure mini-
mization and minority representation. This does, however, not necessarily mean
that minority representation is undesirable. For example, for influenza vaccines
Scherer (2007) analyzes the trade-off between economies of scale and protection
against stochastic shortage risk through multiple sourcing. He concludes that
for plausible scenarios multiple sourcing yields more benefits than costs. On the
other hand, it seems that our results rely on the hypothesis of constant aver-
age cost. Therefore, an interesting question is to consider a richer structure of
the technologies of suppliers and to explore whether the contested procurement
auction can be redefined in such a way that in equilibrium comparable results
are obtained.
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The optimal procurement share auction
We have proposed a particular procurement share auction and shown that it
has remarkable properties. We have not derived an “optimal” procurement
share auction. An interesting question is whether there are other procurement
share auctions that have similar properties to the one analyzed here. From the
outset it is clear that the basic trade-off that we introduce—increasing the price
increases the mark-up over costs but it decreases the share—does not depend on
the particular functional form of contested procurement. For a related class of
forward auctions Yates (2011) establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium.
His analysis, however, also seems to indicate that for other functional forms
of share auctions the remarkable properties of tractability and robustness of
contested procurement are lost.
Valuing minority representation
The present paper reaches stark results because contested procurement outper-
forms standard auctions although the buyer does not put any value on minority
representation. In reality, however, the seller will be willing to trade-off some
savings for minority representation. For example, California’s Certification Pro-
grams establish minimum market share goals for designated bidders, who are
the target of the affirmative action.
A very simple way to extend our analysis to such a setting is to generalize
equation (3) to a CES utility function, as in
U0 (B0,Ψ, P ) =
[
n∑
i=1
(Ψi (B0 − pi))ρ
] 1
ρ
, where 0 < ρ < 1.
Here we define ρ = 1− 1σ , where σ > 1 is the (constant) elasticity of substitution.
Notice that when σ → ∞, U0 (B0, pi, P ) tends to S0 (B0, pi, P ). On the other
hand, when σ is smaller, indifference curves are strictly convex. Therefore,
for the same per capita saving, two providers with the same market share are
preferred to only one. It can be shown that in the context of the example
displayed in Figure 3 σ = 2 pushes the utility associated to α = 1 so much
upwards that for any costs of the domestic provider contested procurement is
preferred to a standard auction. Of course, this does not mean that this is the
best the buyer could do and the optimal choice of the elasticity should depend
on the cost structure of sellers.
When the buyer has no information on this cost structure, generalized con-
tested procurement offers another practical way to trade-off the conflicting ob-
jectives. As different values of the price elasticity of a suppliers market share
solve the trade-off in different ways, the buyer might simply choose one value
once and for all.
Other approaches to putting a value on minority representation might build
on a foundation for the benefits derived from it. In the Introduction we moti-
vated these benefits as reducing the risk incurred that a provider cannot fulfill
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his obligations or the effects of successful affirmative action policies. Concern-
ing the former, one might want to distinguish between situations in which one
seller is not able to provide his share and the other is or is not able to increase
his share on short notice. Also, it seems reasonable that the risk depends on
the firm’s efficiency level, and it might be increasing in the firm’s market share.
Concerning the latter, often the underlying idea is that a positive market share
allows the domestic firm to learn by doing and to become more efficient over
time. One might thus want to evaluate the success of affirmative action policies
with a dynamic model of the evolution of the domestic firm’s efficiency. Denot-
ing by ctd the cost of the domestic firm at time t one possibility is the following.
Assume that the foreign firm’s efficiency level is stable, ctf = c
t−1
f , and that for
each t, ctd ≥ cf implies Ψtd ≤ Ψtf . Learning by doing might be captured by
ctd =
(
1− Ψ
t−1
d
Ψt−1f
)
ct−1d +
Ψt−1d
Ψt−1f
cf .
This means that although the seller assigns a higher share to the most efficient
firm, the cost difference diminishes as shares approach. Further work tackling
these issues are challenging questions for future research.
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Appendix
A Strategic Analysis of Γ2Scp
The aim of this appendix is to provide a formal analysis of the sequential game
Γ2Scp in Section 5. We prove Theorem 2 applying backward induction argu-
ments. Note that Corollary 2 follows from the fact that the informed auctioneer
is minimizing the buyer’s provision cost. Corollary 3 follows from equation (13)
below.
Proof of Theorem 2
Denote by B the budged constraint selected by the auctioneer at the Budged
Stage. Note that at the Contest Stage supplier i’s price pi is undominated if,
and only if pi ∈ (ci, B) when ci < B and pi = ∅ otherwise.
Let us consider the following cases:
Case 1 B ≤ cd. Let us observe that the unique undominated price for the domestic
firm is pd = ∅, implying that there is no procurement and the auctioneer
obtains zero payoffs.
Case 2 B > cd. By Theorem 1 we know that for each B each seller optimally
chooses
pd =
B+cd
2 , and
pf = B − (B−cf )
1
2 (B−cd)
1
2
2 .
}
(12)
Moreover, we have that
S0 (B0; Ψ
cp (B;P ) ;P ) = B0 − pdΨcpd (B; pd, pf )− pfΨcpf (B; pd, pf )
≥ B0 − 1
2
(pd + pf ) ≥ B0 − 1
2
(B + cd)
≥ 1
2
(B0 − cd) > 0, as B0 > cd.
Therefore, at the Budged Stage the auctioneer, anticipating the sellers’ op-
timal decisions, selects a budged B∗ > cd minimizing procurement cost
C (B;P ) =
B − pd
2 (B − pf ) pd +
[
1− B − pd
2 (B − pf )
]
pf .
Taking into account (12), this becomes
Cˆ (B) = B − B − cd
4
[
2
(
B − cf
B − cd
) 1
2
+
(
B − cd
B − cf
) 1
2
− 1
]
. (13)
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Note that its derivative, with respect to B is
dCˆ
dB
(B) =
1
4
[
5− 5
2
(
B − cd
B − cf
) 1
2
−
(
B − cf
B − cd
) 1
2
+
1
2
(
B − cd
B − cf
) 3
2
]
.
The unique real root is reached at
B∗ ' cd − 0.050657cf
0.949343
or, equivalently, when
B∗ − cf
B∗ − cd ' 19.741.
Moreover, since
dCˆ
dB
(B) < 0 for any B < B∗,
and
dCˆ
dB
(B) > 0 for any B > B∗,
we obtain that min{B∗, B0} is the unique minimizer for Cˆ (B). 
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B Analysis of Γcpα
Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout this proof we consider a fixed parameter α > 0. We proceed as
follows. We first show in Lemma 1 that the generalized contested procurement
function is continuously differentiable. Second, Lemma 2 shows that each seller’s
utility function is strictly quasi-concave on the bidding space. Finally, we use a
result by Moulin and Shenker (1992) to construct an equilibrium and to show
that this equilibrium is unique.
Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let k be such that 0 < k < B0. The function φ : [0, B0] → R+
described by
φ (x) =
 12
(
B0−x
B0−k
)α
if k < x ≤ B0
2(B0−x)α−(B0−k)α
2(B0−x)α if 0 ≤ x ≤ k
is continuously differentiable in (0, B0).
Proof. Note that, since φ is polynomial for x 6= k, we only need to check
that
lim
x0→k−
∂φ
∂x
(x0) = lim
x0→k+
∂φ
∂x
(x0) .
Now, taking into consideration that
∂φ
∂x
(x0) =
{
−α2 (B0−x0)
α−1
(B0−k)α if k < x0 < B0
−α2 (B0−k)
α
(B0−x0)α+1 if 0 < x0 < k
we conclude that
lim
x0→k−
∂φ
∂x
(x0) = −α
2
(B0 − k)α
(B0 − k)α+1
= − α
2 (B0 − k) , and
lim
x0→k+
∂φ
∂x
(x0) = −α
2
(B0 − k)α−1
(B0 − k)α = −
α
2
(B0 − k)−1 .

Lemma 2 For each k, 0 < k < B0 and any h in [0, B0] the function ϕ :
[0, B0]→ R described by
ϕ (x) =
 12
(
B0−x
B0−k
)α
(x− h) if k < x ≤ B0
2(B0−x)α−(B0−k)α
2(B0−x)α (x− h) if 0 ≤ x ≤ k
is strictly quasi-concave in (h,B0).
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Proof. Let φ be the function explored in Lemma 1. Note that, given h, ϕ
can be described as
ϕ (x) = (x− h) f (x) .
This function is twice continuous differentiable for x 6= k, and it is continuously
differentiable for x = k. Let us consider the following cases:
(a) h < x0 < k. Then
∂2ϕ
∂x2
(x0) =
1
2
α
(B0 − k)α
(B0 − x0)2+α
(h+ x0 − 2B0 + hα− x0α) .
Therefore,
sign
∂2ϕ
∂x2
(x0) = sign (h+ x0 − 2B0 + hα− x0α) . (14)
Since h ≤ x0 < B0,
h+ x0 − 2B0 + hα− x0α =
(1 + α)h+ (1− α)x0 − 2B0 ≤ 2 (x0 −B0) < 0.
(b) k < x0 < B0. Then
∂2ϕ
∂x2
(x0) =
1
2
α
(B0 − x0)2
(
B0 − x0
B0 − k
)α
(h+ x0 − 2B0 − αh+ αx0) .
By (14) we have that ∂
2ϕ
∂x2 (x0) ≥ 0 only if h−B0 ≥ B0 − x0 + α (h− x0).
But, since
∂ϕ
∂x (x0) =
(B0−x0)α
2(B0−k)α
(
1− α x0−hB0−x0
)
=
(B0−x0)α
2(B0−k)α
(
B0−x0+α(h−x0)
B0−x0
)
,
we have that ϕ is decreasing at x0 if it is not strictly concave.
Summing up, we have that ϕ is strictly concave at x0 whenever
x0 <
2B0 + (α− 1)h
α+ 1
,
and for x0 higher or equal the above, if ϕ is not strictly concave, it is strictly
decreasing. Thus ϕ must be strictly quasi-concave. 
The following lemma is equivalent to Lemma 2 in Moulin and Shenker (1992).
Lemma 3 Let u1 (x) and u2 (x) be two strictly quasi-concave functions from
[a, b] to R that coincide from c ∈ (a, b):
u1 (x) = u2 (x) for all x, c ≤ x ≤ b.
Then the (unique) maximizers of ui (x), denoted xi, are on the same side of c:
x1 ≥ c⇔ x2 ≥ c; x1 = c⇔ x2 = c.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 3.
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Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that an equilibrium (in pure strategies) exists. Let pˆd and pˆf be
the solutions to
maxUd (B0; pˆf , pd) s.t. pˆf ≤ pd ≤ B0, and
maxUf (B0; pf , pˆd) s.t. cf ≤ pf ≤ pˆd.
Note that the sellers’ strategies can be computed using the following sequential
procedure:
(a) Calculate pˆd by maximizing the function
md (pd) = (B0 − pd)α (pd − cd)
on [cd, B0]. Note that this function is strictly quasi-concave on this seg-
ment. Moreover, any solution of the problem above also maximizes the
function
(B0 − pd)α
2 (B0 − p˜f )α (pd − cd)
which coincides with Ud (B0; p˜f , pd) when p˜f ≤ pd.
(b) Compute pˆf by maximizing the function
mf (pf ) =
2 (B0 − pf )α − (B0 − pˆd)α
2 (B0 − pf )α (pf − cf )
on [cf , pˆd]. Note that, since mf is strictly quasi-concave, it must have a
unique maximizer.
Let us remark that (pˆf , pˆd) is characterized by
pˆd =
B0 + αcd
α+ 1
, and
pˆf satisfies
(B0 − pˆf ) = (B0 − αcf + (α− 1) pˆf ) (B0 − pˆd)
α
2 (B0 − pˆf )α .
Now we show that (pˆf , pˆd) described above constitutes an equilibrium for
the game induced by Ψcpα . First, note that p˜f , the unique maximizer of
uf (pf ) =
(B0 − pf )α
2 (B0 − k)α (pf − cf )
is, for any k < B0,
p˜f =
B0 + αcf
α+ 1
≤ pˆd. (15)
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Therefore, since for k = pˆd, the function uf and the foreign seller’s utility
Uf (B0; pf , pˆd) =

(B0−pf )α
2(B0−pˆd)α (pf − cf ) if pˆd < pf ≤ B0
2(B0−pf )α−(B0−pˆd)α
2(B0−pf )α (pf − cf ) if 0 ≤ pf ≤ pˆd
coincide on [pˆd, B0], by Lemma 3 we have that pˆf is the foreign seller’s best-
response to the domestic seller’s strategy. Applying a similar reasoning to agent
d we see that pˆd is his best-response to pˆf .
We now deal with uniqueness of equilibrium. Proceeding by contradiction,
let us assume that there is an equilibrium (p˜f , p˜d) 6= (pˆf , pˆd). Note that, by the
above arguments, we can ensure that p˜f > p˜d. Otherwise, we could argue that
(p˜f , p˜d) is not an equilibrium.
Now, since p˜f > p˜d, agent 1’s strategy should be a maximizer of
(B0 − pf )α
2 (B0 − p˜d)α (pf − cf ) ,
i.e. p˜f should follow expression (15) above. Since the functions
ud (pd) =
(B0 − pd)α
2 (B0 − p˜f )α (pd − cd) , and
Ud (B0; p˜f , pd) =

(B0−pd)α
2(B0−p˜f )α (pd − cd) if p˜f < pd ≤ B0
2(B0−pd)α−(B0−p˜f )α
2(B0−pd)α (pd − cd) if 0 ≤ pd ≤ p˜f
coincide on [p˜f , B0], and pˆd ≥ p˜f is the unique maximizer of ud, by Lemma 3
we know that p˜d ≥ p˜f . A contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Again, throughout this proof we consider a fixed parameter α > 0.
First, note that when
B′ ≤ B0 + αcd
1 + α
(16)
the proof is straightforward. This is because B′ is a dominant strategy for the
domestic provider d.
Therefore, we can conclude that
(a) If (1 + α)B′ ≤ B0 + αcf , both agents have a dominant strategy, pˆi = B′,
and the result is proven; or
(b) If
cf <
(1 + α)B′ −B0
α
≤ cd,
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then the domestic provider has a dominant strategy, which is pˆd = B
′
and, therefore the foreign seller must have a unique undominated strategy,
provided that his opponent selects B′ as his proposed price. This strategy
is the unique maximizer of Uf (B0; pf , B
′).
Therefore, we assume in the rest of the proof that
B0 + αcd
1 + α
< B′ < B0.
We proceed as follows. We propose an iterative procedure to sequentially reduce
each seller’s set of undominated strategies. Then we see that this process is
convergent and that the limit set of (sequentially) undominated strategies is a
singleton.
First, note that it is straightforward to see that, for each agent the set of
undominated strategies is (a subset of)
S0i = (ci, B
′] .
The reason is that an agent selecting a strategy outside S0i will obtain a non-
positive utility, whereas any strategy inside S0i will report a positive utility to
that agent.
Now, consider the intervals S1i =
[
`1i , υ
1
i
]
, where
υ1i = arg maxUi (B0, (pi, B
′)) (17)
and `1i is the minimal price on S
0
i such that
29
Ui
(
B0,
(
υ1i , cj
)) ≥ Ui (B0, (pi, cj)) . (18)
Note that, since Ui is continuous, strictly quasi-concave (for pj given), and
also Ui
(
B0,
(
υ1i , cj
))
> 0, we have the existence of `1i > ci being the minimal
solution for inequality (18).
Let us observe that υ1i dominates any strategy outside S
1
i when the other
seller is selecting a strategy on S0j . The reason is the following. Let us assume
that provider j selects pj , and consider the following cases:
Case 1. pj ≤ B0+αci1+α . Note that, in such a case, the best strategy for provider i is
pˆi =
B0+αci
1+α , and his utility function, for pj fixed, is strictly increasing on[
ci,
B0+αci
1+α
]
. Therefore, for each pi < `
1
i
Ui (B0, (pi, pj)) < Ui
(
B0,
(
`1i , pj
))
= Ui
(
B0,
(
υ1i , pj
))
.
Case 2. pj >
B0+αci
1+α . Note that, in such a case, the best reply for seller i is a
price pˆi that belongs to
(
B0+αci
1+α , υ
1
i
]
. Moreover, for pj given, i’s utility
function is decreasing on [pj , d]. Therefore, for each pi > υ
1
i
Ui
(
B0,
(
υ1i , pj
))
> Ui (B0, (pi, pj)) .
29As usual, when we are analyzing provider i, sub-index j refers to the other supplier.
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So, υ1i dominates any strategy outside S
1
i .
Now, let us construct, for each provider i, the sequence Ski =
[
`ki , υ
k
i
]
, where
υki = arg maxUi
(
B0,
(
pi, υ
k−1
j
))
(19)
and `ki is the minimal price on S
k−1
i such that
Ui
(
B0,
(
υ1i , υ
k−1
j
)) ≥ Ui (B0, (pi, υk−1j )) .
Let us observe that, for each agent i, and iteration k, Sk+1i ⊆ Ski , and this
inclusion is strict whenever υki >
B0+αci
1+α . The reason is that each agent’s utility
function is strictly quasi-concave, and that υki is strictly increasing in υ
k−1
j ,
which is decreasing on k whenever Skj is not a singleton.
Therefore, the sequence of intervals
{
Ski
}∞
k=1
is decreasing (in length), and
thus convergent.
Moreover, since
dυi
dυj
∣∣∣∣
υi<υj
= −
∂
(
1− 12 (B0−υj)α
(
B0−υi+α(υi−ci)
(B0−υi)α+1
))
∂υj
∂
(
1− 12 (B0−υj)α
(
B0−υi+α(υi−ci)
(B0−υi)α+1
))
∂υi
=
=
(B0 − υi)
(B0 − υj)
B0 − υi + (υi − ci)α
B0 − υi + (υi − ci)α+B0 − ci >
>
(B0 − υi)
(B0 − υi) + (B0 − ci) >
1
2
,
we have that, whenever υki < υ
k−1
j , υ
k
i − υk+1i is always positive and does
not converge to zero. This implies that the sequence
{
Ski
}∞
k=1
converges to a
singleton. 
Proof of Theorem 5
Let us observe that, at equilibrium,30 Pˆ = (pˆf , pˆd) must satisfy
pˆd =
B0 + αcd
α+ 1
, and (20)
(B0 − pˆf ) = 1
2
(
B0 − pˆd
B0 − pˆf
)α
[B0 + (α− 1) pˆf − αcf ] . (21)
By equation (20) we know that, by selecting α high enough, we can guarantee
that pˆd is very close to cd. Moreover, as the following Lemma 4 establishes, we
can select α such that pˆf < cd. Theorem 5 is a direct consequence of these facts.
30Note that Pˆ depends on α. Slightly abusing notation we use Pˆ instead of Pˆ (α).
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Lemma 4 There is αˆ > 1 such that, at equilibrium
pˆf =
αˆ
αˆ− 1cd −
1
αˆ− 1B0.
Proof. Let us construct the function g : R→ R as
g (α) =
α
α− 1 −
α (cd − cf )
2 (B0 − cd)
(
α− 1
α+ 1
)α
.
Let us observe that g is continuous for α > 1. Moreover,
(i) limα→1+ g (α) = +∞, and
(ii) limα→+∞ g (α) = −∞.
Thus, by applying Bolzano’s Theorem, we obtain the existence of αˆ such
that g (αˆ) = 0. Taking into account that g is strictly decreasing, we also can
guarantee that αˆ is unique.
Let us observe that g (αˆ) = 0 implies that
pˆf =
αˆ
αˆ− 1cd −
1
αˆ− 1B0
is a solution of
(B0 − pˆf ) = 1
2
(
B0 − pˆd
B0 − pˆf
)αˆ
[B0 + (αˆ− 1) pˆf − αˆcf ] ,
which is the desired result. 
We next show that, by selecting the parameter α appropriately, the buyer
can guarantee that her savings exceed B0 − cd. The statement of Theorem 5 is
a direct consequence of our next result.
Lemma 5 There exist α˜ such that, at equilibrium,
S0
(
B0, Pˆ
)
> B0 − cd.
Proof. Given sellers’ costs, let α˜ > 1 be such that
B0 − pˆf = α˜
α˜− 1 (B0 − cd) ,
whose existence was proved in Lemma 4 above. Let us observe that
S0
(
B0, Pˆ
)
=
1
2
(
B0 − pˆd
B0 − pˆf
)α˜
(B0 − pˆd) +
[
1− 1
2
(
B0 − pˆd
B0 − pˆf
)α˜]
(B0 − pˆf ) .
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Taking into account that
B0 − pˆf = α˜α˜−1 (B0 − cd) , and
B0 − pˆd = α˜α˜+1 (B0 − cd) ,
we have that
B0 − pˆd
B0 − pˆf =
(
α˜
α˜+1
α˜
α˜−1
)
=
α˜− 1
α˜+ 1
< 1,
and thus
Ψcpα˜d
(
B0, Pˆ
)
<
1
2
, and Ψcpα˜f
(
B0, Pˆ
)
>
1
2
.
Therefore,
S0
(
B0, Pˆ
)
>
1
2
[(B0 − pˆf ) + (B0 − pˆd)] = α˜
2
α˜2 − 1 (B0 − cd) > (B0 − cd) ,
which is the desired result. 
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C Analysis of Γctcpα
For the convenience of the referees, this Appendix provides a proof of Theorem
6. It is, however, not intended for publication.
When mechanism Γctcpα is applied, let us remember that at each t ∈ [0, 1)
both providers simultaneously select an action ai (t) ∈ {0, 1}. This action de-
pends on the history of the game, namely the actions taken by both agents at
any t′ < t. Notice that the only relevant information that a provider extracts
at time t from the history is:
(i) If he selected stop at an earlier point in time, i.e. if there is t′ < t such that
ai (t
′) = 1. In such a case his action at t does not affect the final outcome.
(ii) If his rival selected stop at an earlier point in time, i.e. if there is t′ < t
such that aj (t
′) = 1.
(iii) If aj (t
′) = 1 for some t′ < t, and ai (t′) = 0 for each t′ < t, the minimum
value of tˆ for which aj
(
tˆ
)
= 1, i.e. t˜j .
For our purposes the history of the game can thus be represented as
H : [0, 1)→ [0, 1]2 (22)
such that, for each t ∈ (0, 1), and any i, Hi (t) ∈ [0, t) ∪ {1}. In such a case,
Hi (t) = t′ < t refers to the case in which provider i selects stop at t′ after
continuing at any t
′′
< t′. Similarly, Hi (t) = 1 is interpreted as continuing or
ai (t
′) = 0 for all t′ < t.
Let us observe that, given the history of the game at time t, H (t), provider
i’s optimal action is:
(1) Any action if Hi (t) < t. This is so because he selected stop at an earlier
point in time and is thus unable to affect the final outcome.
(2) If Hi (t) = 1, we consider the following two scenarios:
(a) Hj (t) = 1. Then, if ai (t) = 1, it should be the case that pi ≥ pj .
This is the optimal action for provider i whenever
pi ≥ B0 + αci
1 + α
,
or equivalently in terms of time when
t ≥ α
1 + α
B0 − ci
B0
.
Therefore, the optimal action for agent i is
ai (t) =
{
0 if t < α1+α
B0−ci
B0
1 if t ≥ α1+α B0−ciB0 .
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(b) Hj (t) = t′ < t. Note that, in such a case pi < pj . Provider i computes
his optimal decision provided that pi ≤ (1− t)B0; i.e. he solves the
problem
maxt+
(
1−
(
t′
t+
)α)
((1− t+)B0 − ci)
s.t. t+ ≥ t
}
(23)
Note that the above description characterizes dominant strategies for the
agents, and that the actions of the providers implied by these strategies satisfy:
(a) For the domestic provider
ad (t) =
{
0 if t < α1+α
B0−cd
B0
1 if t = α1+α
B0−cd
B0
.
(b) For the foreign provider
af (t) =
{
0 if t < tˆ
1 if t = tˆ,
where tˆ is the unique maximizer of(
1−
(
α
1 + α
B0 − cd
tB0
)α)
((1− t)B0 − cf )
in the interval
[
α
1+α
B0−cd
B0
, 1
]
.
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